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Abstract— March 2019, Facebook updated its security procedures requesting ID verification for people who wish to advertise or 
promote political posts of adverts. The announcement received little media coverage even though it is an interesting development in the 
battle against Fake News. This paper reviews the current literature on different approaches in the battle against the spread of fake news, 
including the use of computer algorithms, A.I, and introduction of ID checks. Critical to the evaluation is consideration into ID checks as 
a means to combat the spread of Fake News.  To understand the process and how it works, the team undertook a social experiment 
combined with reflective analysis to understand the impact of ID check policies better when combined with other standards policies of a 
typical platform. The analysis identifies grave concerns. In a wider context, standardising such policy will leave political activists in 
countries vulnerable to reprisal from authoritarian regimes. Other impacts include people who use fake names to protect the identity of 
adopted children or to protect anonymity from abusive partners. The analysis also points to the fact that troll arms could bypass these 
checks rendering the use of ID checks less effective in the battle to combat fake news. 
Keywords— Misinformation; Fake News; Social Media; Algorithm; Artificial Intelligence, Policies; Ethical impact. 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Nowadays, millions of users are attracted to social media and its different platforms, which enables users to share information, 
personal interests, news, etc. easily across the web. Since the majority of the unverified information that is shared across social media 
has been presented as facts, believing or disbelieving such information has become a major challenge. The source of misinformation 
spread is normally malicious users who are motivated to influence other users’ views or motivated by financial gains. Fake news, 
dotted images, chain emails, misleading news, spam, out of context videos and images are various forms of misinformation. The need 
for bringing some credibility for verifying content shared online as well as improving users’ experience on social media is vital. 
Hence there have been multiple attempts to develop means and tools to minimise the spread of misinformation on social media. Thus, 
allowing misinformation flow freely on social media not only wastes users’ time but can also be dangerous [1]. Several approaches 
have been developed to limit the spread of fake news by allowing users to authenticate it from within their web browsers [2], A.I [3], 
labelling news [4], and many more.  
II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
The quality of information shared on social media is becoming more significant as more users on social media platforms search for 
the news [16]. In this section, we present the work done by social media companies in combatting fake news that is reported in 
academic literature. These papers have explored proposed approaches and techniques that are based on platform policies, digital 
algorithms, filter, and Artificial Intelligence (A.I.) in the process of detecting fake news. 
In [3], authors claim to have developed a process for automating fake news detection on Twitter. They achieved it by learning how 
to forecast precision assessments in two dedicated Twitter datasets.  
 
The first data set is a credbank, a crowdsourced dataset of precision assessments for events on Twitter. The second one is called 
pheme. Pheme represents dataset of potential gossips on Twitter and newspapers assessments of their truthfulness. Such a 
computerised system is said to have been able to detect fake news in popular Twitter threads. As part of the process, the model 
includes the use of crowdsourced workers in updating and maintaining the datasets. In their experiments, crowdsourced workers 
outperform both newspapers assessment and models trained workers. The argument being, crowdsourced workers, provide an easy 
way to categorise true and false stories on Twitter compared to newspapers. This model, while promising, continue to have two key 
risks associated with building trust in both the technological element and the human element. 
 
The works of [4] looked at trust in rating fake news to be fake and factual. The authors suggested that online fake news can be 
opposed to some degree of success when appropriate tags are used. The result of their study found that both “Disputed” and “Rated 
false” tags modestly decrease trust in sharing false news; an issue previously explored, described and developed in [9] and [10]. 
 However, their results demonstrated that “Rated false” tags, which exactly articulate to users that the news is not true to appear to 
be more effective at decreasing trust in misinformation than the “Disputed” tags used by the Facebook. When compared to all-
purpose notices regarding fabricated news, it was also found to reduce trust in false headlines. However, the effect of these warnings 
was too small compared. Additionally, all-purpose warnings also decreased trust in factual news and did not improve the effects of 
the “Rated false” and “Disputed” tags. The authors have listed several limitations, but despite these limitations, their study showed 
important perceptions into how efforts to stop trust in misinformation on social media could be more effective.  
 
Another approach to combating social media is shown in [6] where authors attribute the spread of fake news to a term called “filter 
bubbles”. Filter bubbles are the digital echo chamber where users see content and posts that agree only with their preexisting beliefs. 
While social media platform aims to encourage users of the same interests to share ideas and stay online longer, the unintended 
consequence is that these users end up living in an information ‘bubble’. In such an environment, fake news can go unchallenged 
but further enforced by the agreeability infested in being shared in a ‘filter bubble’. The work of [6] concludes that the dissemination 
of fake news may, at times, not break out of the filter bubble at its point of origin. In fact, the work of [11] shows that the 
dissemination of fake news is similar to the epidemic and that such stories typically stay inside the same groups. 
 
Research by [7] categorised important problems that make social media platforms role hard in combatting fight fake news. The 
researchers described a set of intervention models, categorised under the four regulatory modalities. As part of a discussion, the 
paper looks at the ease with which fake news generators can provide online content that appears to be authentic as well as the 
financial stakes that platforms have in sharing fake material online. The principles of the ‘filter bubble’ seems to influence much of 
the findings. Clients of fake news have a strong disposition to accept the news and thus limited incentive to participate in challenging 
and validating its content. A key component in making fake news believable is to introduce fibres of truth [7].  
 
The work of [32] confirms the environment that many suspects from a platform that has grown faster than its policies can keep up. 
In [32], the researchers review the case study of US elections, where a survey of staffers, politicians, and email exchanges shows 
that much of Google and Facebook’s policies are written on the go. In [8] authors present investigation on a platform-based policy 
in managing and combatting fake news. The work looks at both self-regulated by social networks and government intervened. From 
one side, the authors describe how direct government intervention may be accused of biases and lack of independence. Concerns 
raised that government-based policies may impact freedom of speech. Instead, the authors suggest that governments enable an 
approach [8] dubbed “tort lawsuits alleging”. Under this approach, policies would be shaped by lawsuits initiated by people affected 
or harmed by the impact of fake news. To facilitate this approach, social networks could provide users with indications of source 
quality that can be merged into the algorithmic rankings of news.  
Moreover, these platforms can reduce the personalisation of political information content and allow alternative reporting of news 
and views. Thus, remove users from filter-imposed bubbles. Methods that underline at present trending news could be redesigned 
to allow a variety of news. Social networks could control the automated spread of news content by bots and Cyborgs. In the context 
of this research, Cyborgs are consumers who automatically share news from a set of sources, sometimes without reading them at 
all [15].  
 
In [16], the authors showed a framework for detection of bots on Twitter. The system is a machine-learning algorithm that can 
extracts features divided into six different classes. The first and second classes are users and friends’ meta-data. Third and fourth 
classes are network patterns and activity time series. The last two classes are tweet content and sentiment. The system would 
evaluate patterns, thus developing a framework which is trained on a dataset of bots. The results suggest an accuracy of 0.95 Area 
Under Curve (AUC). Thus, a good precision but a margin of error will need enhancing. 
Moreover, their analysis suggests that user meta-data and content features are the two most important sources of data to detect 
typical bots on the social platform. Groups recognised by this analysis point principally into different types of bots. However, in 
several instances, the boundary that separates these groups is not obvious, suggesting further research is needed in this area. 
 
In a similar study, authors in [14] investigated automated behaviour of bots on Twitter. Using a flexible and transparent classification 
scheme, the authors showed the potential of using linguistic features as a means of classifying automated bot activity on Twitter. 
As these features do not use the metadata provided by Twitter, the classification scheme presented in [14] is also applicable to other 
social media platforms. The paper suggests that current algorithm-based approaches by social media giants rely on metadata sets to 
find automated bot accounts; this is done by using variables such as the time between tweets, number of followers, etc. In the same 
paper, authors demonstrated a classification scheme that uses the natural language text from non-bot users to deliver a standard for 
detecting accounts that post automated bot posts. 
 
Despite the many advances in algorithm-based detection of fake news, it seemed inevitable that A.I. is the natural partner in building 
the knowledge that would adapt to variations by determined fake news generators. In [5], the authors showed an important potential 
application of A.I. in recognising “fake news” online. Communicating in a network vocabulary, A.I would use “latency” in delays 
 before a transfer of data begins following an instruction for its transfer to perform analysis. The latency that human fact-checkers 
brings into fake news dissemination appears to be to take too long to soften the harm done by fake news. Thus [5] suggest faster, 
reliable and more stable A.I. methods are needed in fighting misinformation online. The aim is to have A.I methods that can 
categorise news as either genuine or fake based on two approaches. The first approach uses linguistic and semantic analysis of 
written content to make their identification. The second approach uses sharing patterns and rates to categorise news into rumours 
and non-rumours. A combination of both helps A.I. identify posts that are factual or fake. 
 
The social networks have attempted some of preventing steps and others as described above. In 2018, authors in [8] reported several 
actions taken by the social media platform to address the spread of fake news. Twitter blocked some accounts connected to Russian 
users and users connected to those accounts. Facebook announced a determination to shift its algorithm to check for “quality” in its 
content curation process. Nevertheless, the social networks have not given sufficient fact for evaluation to the research community 
nor shared their results for peer review to support their efforts. There exists a huge need that social networks work with academic 
researchers in assessing the scope of the fake news problem and the design and implementation of actions against the sharing of 
fake news. There is warning that poorly structured policies intended to combat the spread of fake news are sometimes inadvertently 
harming those fighting fake news. The authors of [28] highlight the case of StopFake, a Ukranian fact-checking group operating on 
Facebook. The group saw many of its followers’ accounts closed for sharing articles intended to point out fake posts as opposed to 
sharing of fake posts. However, Facebook’s algorithm did not seem to distinguish between those who share fake news and those 
who share news about fake news and in the process, harmed the activities of the StopFake’s group. 
 
After the 2016 U.S. election, Mark Zuckerberg announced “of all the content on Facebook, more than 99% of what people see is 
authentic. Only a very small content is fake news and hoaxes. Overall, this makes it extremely unlikely hoaxes changed the outcome 
of this election in one direction or the other” [12]. Evidently, at the time, even heads of social media giants were not well informed 
of the challenges they are facing. 
 
In [17], authors report that Facebook has rolled out a policy that requires businesses and individuals actively promoting political 
activities and ads to undergo ID verification. The article suggests the ID check is Facebook’s attempt to curb Russian’s interference 
in EU elections and preparation to manage the 2020 USA election. For the policy to work, the social media platform is using 
algorithms and A.I. to identify potential fake profiles. Alex Schultz, Facebook’s Vice President of Analytics, explains in the 
company’s news release that the launch of Facebook’s algorithm has successfully closed over 100 million accounts [29]. 
III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This paper attempts to answer three research questions:  
 
1. How effective is Facebook’s algorithm in detecting a fake profile? 
2. How effective is Facebook’s A.I. in learning from its operations? 
3. What is the ethical impact of Facebook’s changes that introduces ID checks to its policies? 
To answer these questions, the team suggested an experiment to test the capabilities of the social media algorithm in detecting a 
fake profile involved in sharing fake news. Since no experiment of this kind has ever been conducted before in the literature, there 
was a need to design a tailored experiment for this purpose. Following a brainstorming session, the team identified the following 
key characteristics of the experiment:  
 
1. The profile should have the hallmarks of a fake profile with a fake name and lacks bio information. 
2. The photo to be picked as a random none human photo. 
3. Profile to accept anyone who is suggested by the platform to be a friend and add all suggested profiles. 
4. The profile to avoid political posts but join a variety of groups and repost their posts indiscriminately. 
 
Agreeing that the likelihood of platform algorithm detecting the profile as fake, the team suggested additional matching profiles is 
created with few modifications to test how well the A.I. aspect of the algorithm is able to learn from its first detection.  
In the process, the team will be using reflective analysis to study the process of creating, building, and identifying fake news on the 
user(s) of profiles with fake names.  
Reflective analysis, also known as reflexivity, is a research methodology presented in academic literature [18] [19] [20]. Some 
academic publications treat this analysis approach as an independent approach or part of a wider approach to transformative learning 
[21]. 
In [22], the authors discuss reflective research approach where they capitalise on their personal experiences, analyses them and 
provides findings that can be generalised to a wider set of circumstances. 
 
  
 
Figure 1.  Reflection Process [23] 
 In the reflection process, academics would use their knowledge that they already have in the form of experience, judgements, 
concepts, and feelings, coupled with new findings or information to make a reflective analysis of a given situation [23]. In [23], the 
author suggests that a reflective approach is suitable in cases where there is no obvious or immediate solution, and the input is 
complicated or unstructured. The author presented reflection as a form of thinking that is represented in an input–outcome model, 
as shown in Figure 1. 
 
The reflective analysis will help learn from the experiment, critical review shortcomings, resolution of uncertainty with regards to 
impact, and anticipation of impact. Hence, interviewing and observation will be key inputs in the experiment. 
IV. THE EXPERIMENT  
In theory, the Facebook algorithm picks up a set of patterns and reports from users; then it requires a suspect profile to validate their 
details, including their ID and home address. It is most definitely Facebook latest attempt to curb fake news. A summary of the 
experiment process is provided in figure 2. 
 
  Figure 2.  Research experiment process 
 
 
Stage 1: Fake Profile Detection 
To test the system, a single new profile under an assumed Arabic name. The name used is a generic name with random Arabic stock 
photo of an oriental carpet, and no bio details whatsoever. To trigger the algorithm, the profile rejected the requests to include a 
mobile number, connect to email to invite friends, and went about adding all friend suggestions put forward by the platform. To 
further antagonise the algorithm, the profile started almost instantly posted and sharing a variety of liberal and anti-fundamentalist 
posts. By accepting anyone and everyone who wants to a friend, the profile massed more than 500 friends in less than three weeks. 
There was no indication that most of the other profiles that linked to our profile looked genuine either.  
To maintain a sustainable bot like activities, the team took turns to keep the random posting and engagement of the profile in nothing 
but post sharing. The team noted concerns that profiles and pages are being closed by the algorithm, thus by week three the algorithm 
had yet to identify the fake profile we had created. On day 22, the algorithm identified the profile as fake. Initially, the algorithm 
locked the profile demanding confirmation of a telephone number and photo. The analysis of activities that triggered the lockout 
was inconclusive. It was what made the algorithm. Several theories emerged including patterns of postings; duration passed where 
the profile rejected attempts to provide valid bio content, a flood of post sharing done the night before, possible reporting by other 
users, or combination of these building a pattern identified by the algorithm. 
The team recreated the same profile with minor variations of the name, change of email, a similar photo and no bio. Timewise, the 
algorithm, however, took only 24 hours to lock the profile out. The team was able to narrow reasons why the algorithm got triggered 
to similar patterns. The profile moved to join the same groups, to share the posts, and to link to the same individuals. Another 
interesting development this time was the fact the locking out happened while online. The profile was labelled as fake and locked 
out. 
In a final experiment, the team attempted to take some credible steps to mask the profile. Suspecting that the algorithm is likely to 
be identifying the connection, browser cookies, and other features linked to the machine, the team used a different machine with a 
different IP connection. Two variables remained the same, a fake name, no bio, and rejecting any attempts to link to friends via 
emails or mobile phone. Still, the A.I. element of the algorithm had learned of a pattern and locked profile out in under 30 minutes. 
At this point, there was no longer viable reason to continue experimenting as the A.I. element of the algorithm had learned key 
aspects of the process and was ready to lock the profile out faster than any time before.   
 
Stage 2: Studying the profile validation process 
To further test the algorithm’s abilities in identifying machines linked to fake profiles, the team attempted to login to a genuine 
profile from the first machine used to create fake profiles. One of the team members decided to play the role of a genuine user and 
to log in using his genuine profile details. From what the algorithm now suspects are a fake serial profile generating machine, 
Facebook redirected us to a welcoming message requiring additional security checks. The message advised the user to increase 
security and to include either 2-tier login checks using the Authenticator App or using the registered email. We chose to use the 
Authenticator App.  
To verify the profile as genuine, we elected to apply for the voluntary ID check, as shown in figure 3. 
First, the system asked to confirm the home country. Then required a full home address and the system advised that it will cross-
check that information. The indication being a UK electoral record check as the processing took a fraction of a minute and it came 
back with ‘Verified’.  Should the address come back as invalid, the system would have asked to confirm the address by post whereby 
the user will have to wait for a letter from Facebook with a code. Finally, the system requested an upload an identification document 
giving us several options with the key ones being: Driving License, Passport, Birth Certificate, Visa, Voter ID Card, etc. It is evident 
that these documents are key to any claiming of UK residency. Our user-submitted a scanned copy of a passport; in less than a 
minute, a small message flashed on the corner of the screen stating the profile has been successfully validated. The user is now able 
to share and pay political ads and posts, see figure 4. 
  
   
Figure 3. Facebook ID Checks 
 
 
Figure 4: Facebook Confirmation of identity message. 
 
Stage 3: Reflection and Ethical Impact 
ID checks are a new method the combines algorithm and A.I. to enforced policy-based approach in the battle against the spread of 
fake news. The policy aims to close down large fake news generators and newsgroups, especially those directed or managed 
 remotely. Requiring ID checks would make it harder to generate the kind of troll armies (also called troll factories and farms) that 
some have accused Russia of using to influence election outcomes or undermine democracies. But will it work? 
  
In the reflective analysis, we identified some ethical concerns. Enforcing ID checks will have a detrimental impact on individuals 
who prefer to remain anonymous when sharing perfectly valid political views. There is most definitely a concern among people in 
many countries who may want to share political views without risk of reprisal from otherwise authoritarian regimes. Facebook 
policy, if taken literally, requires all users to use their real names. Technically, Facebook does not allow nicknames, pet names, cute 
names, and metaphors. Individuals are therefore required to disclose their full names, their real photos, and connect with friends 
and family; all three activities that can help identify who they are. 
 
Another concern is the security of the documents uploaded to the platform. Facebook suggests that the communication is encrypted, 
and the ID will be deleted within 30 days of the submission.  One user from India who runs a secular page critical of religious 
authorities and fundamentalism had messaged us on messenger saying he had to do the ID check to protect his page from being 
closed by the algorithm. His concern, however, was that his details might fall into the wrong hands as his life will be endangered. 
To avoid his conversation being picked up by the algorithm, the user communicated with us using text written on images. Our 
analysis suggests that many secular and liberal bloggers in countries where they are not able to speak openly or have a high risk of 
being targeted will have a problem with this new requirement. They are, after all, much more vulnerable to being reported as fake 
when they cannot use their real names or faces photos. 
  
It could be argued that asking for ID checks is the cost we must endure to stop the weaponisation of social media for political gains 
by foreign countries. Our analysis of the process suggests, however, that this approach is open to abuse.  
 
Hackers have, in the past, hacked large stashes of people’s ID in the UK and USA. Ironically, some were taken directly from 
Instagram and Facebook, not once but many times [24]. The Facebook validation process relies on what appears to be a basic 
identity check. An international and organised troll army will be able to overcome these with some success. A combination of 
having a list of people, copies of their ID’s and their electoral home addresses, and troll army may be able to validate a large volume 
of profiles. Permutations of profiles may suggest that first attempts take three weeks for the algorithm to identify a profile, and three 
weeks is a long time to influence an election. 
 
A review on our user’s profile list of friends shows several acquaintances who use alternative names or photos for privacy or to 
protect themselves. For example, two parents who changed their Facebook names on the request of their social workers to maintain 
the privacy of their adopted son; and one friend running away from an abusive domestic partner and the other was harassed by a 
stranger online. Both changed their names and used generic photos to mask their identities. Our analysis shows that these are not 
unique cases.  
 
V. ANALYSIS AND OUTCOMES 
In answering the research questions, the experiment demonstrated the following: 
 
1. How effective is Facebook’s algorithm in detecting a fake profile? 
 
In the first instance, the platform has demonstrated slow detection in identifying a fake profile that extended for over three 
weeks. However, the system progressively improved in what appear to be machine language learning. Ultimately, the algorithm 
has been effective in spotting all three profiles and using a combination of approaches that suggests A.I. an integral part of that 
process. It is clear that the model looks at the magnitude of metrics in flagging a given profile as fake. 
 
2. How effective is Facebook’s A.I. in learning from its operations? 
 
In sequence, the fake profiles took three weeks, then twenty-four hours, and finally thirty minutes to be identified. The A.I. 
element of the platform demonstrated highly active learning from past patterns that is effective at slowing the activities of 
prolific fake profile generators. Reports from other users on the platform also confirms this finding. 
 
3. What are the ethical impacts of a platform introducing ID checks policy? 
 
The reflective analysis presented in this paper suggests that the approach would change the fabric of the debate and not always 
in a positive way. It would impact the privacy of many individuals and exacerbate the risk many political activists take in 
 managing their political activities online. Where individuals are interested in challenging the norm while protecting their 
identity, social media platform adopting ID checks will hamper their ability to be effective in their approach.  
 
On technical applicability of the algorithm and A.I, one can conclude from the first two research questions that the Facebook model 
is promising. The social media platform was able to learn and detect our fake profiles at a rate of three weeks, twenty-four hours, 
and lastly thirty minutes. Therefore, this experiment backs Facebook’s claims [29] that suggest they have been successful at closing 
many fake profiles. This success needs to be balanced with an approach that does not violates individual rights and penalising and 
isolating users who prefer to remain anonymous.  
  
Facebook’s approach only attempts to fix one problem in a pool of many problems social media platforms have with fake news. 
Politically oriented Fake News may be a serious concern, but medical advice fake news also kills. Anti-vax posts and fake cancer 
treatments are rife of social media. Are social media platforms going to be asking people to upload their medical certificates to be 
allowed to post or share medical advice? Many of these posts are shared by genuine profiles and individuals motivated by tribalistic 
beliefs. 
 
Breaking news, local news, human stories, historical events posts, quotes, satirical posts, celebrity news, art news, and science news 
[25] have all been subject to fake news with some having serious consequences. While there is still no evidence that the policy will 
be effective in slowing down prolific and determined state-sponsored troll armies.  
 
There is a startling warning from several researchers with regards to an inherited risk with having policies that are enforced by 
algorithms and A.I. Ultimately, individuals or state-sponsored troll armies who are determined to push their style of news are likely 
to learn what works and what does not work by means of trial and errors. Thus, determined fake news content generators are likely 
to develop ways to bypass the system’s metrics [26] [27]. The success of this policy, combined with other policies introduced to 
curb the spread of fake news, will be put to the public test in the US presidential election of 2020. 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS  
This paper has been able to demonstrate how policy based on A.I. and software algorithm enforcement methods can be effective in 
implementing these regulations at a wide scale. Also, the paper’s analysis presented serious concerns to the individual rights that 
need to be considered in the wider context of fighting fake news. The literature study showed that this would not be the first time 
shortsighted and less then well-evaluated policies failed to account to appropriate reflective analysis on individual rights.  
 
The paper acknowledges that the experiment is the only representative of one experiment with many variables. The ability to control 
some of these variables proved to be less effective in identifying what triggers an algorithm to identify fake profiles. In our opinion, 
the combination of fake profile photo, not being selective in building friendships, lack of friendship behaviours such as likes and 
comments from friends, and therefore not having displayed characteristics of human networking are most likely the control variables 
of the AI algorithm that could be tested in future research. All these variables are hard to fake as an individual but may be possible 
to fake as cyber bot group. Facebook and other platforms are not likely to provide confidential data about the way their algorithms 
operate in identifying fake users.  
 
Future research should consider the long-term impact of A.I and algorithm-based policies. In addition, there should be some 
comparison on how different platform to attempt to use A.I and algorithm-based policies to combat fake news. As well as 
considering how those determined to feed social media platforms, fake news will attempt to bypass these policies. More testing 
could identify further gaps in Facebook and other social media algorithms. This is particularly important as Facebook, and other 
platforms are increasingly being used as OpenID providers, a told to authenticate user ID and link to other website and applications 
[33]. 
 
Finally, the current policies that attempt to address segments of the fake news problem by removing it are running the risk of being 
accused of censorship. The platform is failing to listen to academic research into softer human approaches that suggest providing 
validation tools that would allow users to make that informed decision [30] [31].  
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